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Strategic Competition over School Inputs and Outputs
Gary Richard Cohen*
Abstract

Although public schools are not generally subject to direct competition for students, it is commonly thought that
they nonetheless .face competition through parents' residential choice. Such competitive effects are likely to depend
on the relative proximity of school districts if it is less costly to move short distances than long, or if parents are
able t.o more easily send their children to nearby districts through open enrollment policies. Using panel data for
607 Ohio school districts from 1998 to 2007, I test for strategic interaction over teacher salaries and standardized
test scores. I present evidence that Ohio public school districts act to 'follow their neighbors; - that is, that they
attempt to exactly mirror changes in the inputs and outputs of nearby school districts ~and I show that this result
is robust to different definitions of 'neighbor.' Ifurther show that conventional estimation of spatial autoregressive
models via Maximum Likelihood or via poorly-instrumented General Method of Moments may create large biase~ in
the estimated spatial autocorrelation coefficient. I suggest that this statistical phenomenon may explain some of the
differences in ' estimated magnitudes of school competition across the spatial literature.
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Introduction

F'tiblic education in the United States is highly decentralized compared to other.developed coUntries, both
in finance and in instruction methods. This creates great heteroge~eityamong school districts, so that even
distriCts which are geographically near to one another may vary significantly in goals and performance. In
Northeast Ohio, the districts of Richmond Heights and South Euclid-Lyndhurst sit less than three miles apart
and have similar demographic characteristics. However, South Euclid-Lyndhurst schools are rated 'effective'
by the Ohio Department'of Education, meeting 15 of 26 state indicators (such as adequate performance on
proficiency tests) and boasting a 96% on-time graduation nitej by contrast, Richmond Heights is rated a
'continuous improvement' district - meeting only 8 state indicators and graduating only 88% of their students
on time.
In the past decade, addressing such inequalities became regarded as the purview of federal policymakers.
However, federal reforms attempting to impose uniform standards on public schools - most infamously the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 - have seen little success and large controversy. As those who craft education
policy have increasingly begun to advocate 'school choice' programs as a means to introduce competitive
discipline into the public school system, economists have increasingly turned their attention to understanding
the mechanisms by which that competition occurs.
While nearby school districts do have the potential to vary widely in many respects, there is reason to
believe that they exert important influences on one another. Although public schools do not needto compete
*1 am indebted to Professor Hirschel Kasper for his guidance on both the structure and content of this work. 1 also owe
special thanks to Professor Ron Cheung for his assistance with the spatial econometrics. Lastly, I would like to thank the rest
of the Oberlin College Economics faculty and my two student discussants, Eric Hardy and Ian Walker, for their comments on
the first draft of this paper.
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1. Introduction

directly for students in the way that private schools do, they are nonetheless accountable to parents to the
extent that parents vote on school finances and are able to move between districts in order to send their
children elsewhere.
These effects are further magnified in Ohio, where the 'property tax reduction factor' and the large
proportion of schools that admit students under open enrollment give parents greater powers of voice and
exit. When a:n Ohio school district passes a levy, its revenue is fixed until it can renew the levy or pass
another; if property values rise, the tax rate automatically falls to compensate. This makes school districts
more accountable to parents' wishes, as the only way out of a binding nominal revenue constraint is by
popular vote. In addition, most districts allow students to apply to enroll in other schools or other districts
without moving residency - neighboring districts in some cases, and any Ohio district in others. This
drastically lowers the cost of exiting a poorly-performing district. Because parents are able to observe the
actions and the particular advantages of other school districts - particularly those that are geographically
close - they are likely to take these observations into account when voting or making attendance decisions
about their local schools. 1
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that these interactive effects between school districts are spatially
dependent. It is reasonable to assume that parents takirig advantage of open enrollment policies will be more
likely to send their children to nearby schools, whether they are explicitly restricted to neighboring districts
or whether they simply wish to avoid unreasonably long commutes for their children. It is also reasonable
to assume that it is less costly for parents to move residence between nearby districts than between those
that are far apart.
Because of this, spatial econometric methods may provide useful insight into the nature and degree of such
interactions. By allowing for the identification of a causal 'spillover' effect between nearby school districts,
a spatial econometric analysis is able to identify the ways in which school districts respond to the decisions
of their neighbors.
Empirical work on strategic competition among schools is importan( because. the predictions of theory
are ambiguous. An increase in the observed quality of ~ne school district may encourage nearby districts to
respond strategically, making similar improvements in order to retain students and thus funding. 2 Absent
strategic behavior, an increase in the quality of one school district will raise property values and thus the
expected value of future taxes. It then may push those who place little value on public education to move to
other districts with lower expected tax burdens, while attracting those who highly value public education.
This:would lead to some districts 'specializing' in having good schools, while others 'speCialize' in having low
tax costs. 3
On the other hand, the spatial effects of school competition on teacher salaries are neither theoretically
ambiguous nor untreated by quantitative research. Teachers compete in regional labor markets; an increase
in salaries in one district creates pressure on nearby others to increase their own salaries in order to attract
and retain teachers. Although tenure is far more important in the market for public school teachers than in
other.s, previous empirical research has found large and significant (on the order of 64% to 100%) 4 spillover
1 The average student mobility over the sample - defined as the number of students enrolled in a district for less than one
year ~ is 8%, with a standard deviation of 5%. This translates to 1 in 12.5 with some variation, meaning that most parents
probably choose districts before students start school but that there is some movement.
2 See section 2 of Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007)
3 See Nechyba (2003) for a formal model.
4 Winters (2010) defines 'neighbor' as school districts within fifty miles and weights nearby districts more greatly than distant
ones. He finds teacher salaries in a district increase about sixty-four cents for every dollar increase in a district's neighbors.
MiIlirrtet and Rangapras<;Ld (2007) consider districts neighbors if they are in the same county and find salary increases that
match neighbors up to dollar-far-dollar parity.
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effects from the spatially-weighted averages of neighboring districts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most relevant literature on public schools.
Section 3 discusses the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence drawn
from spatial econometric analysis. Section 5 provides sensitivity analysis for the empirical results. The last
section concludes and discusses possibilities for further study.

2

Review of the Literature

The assertion that schools compete is hardly new. 5 Though research into the economics of education
has long considered competition between public schools through households' decisions to locate based on
the costs and benefits of local public services,6 only recently have expliCit spatial econometric models been
applied to competition between schools .. Spatial econometric methods show much promise for the analysis of interactions between neighboring schools, allowing researchers to look beyond the overall effects of
competition in educational markets and investigate the strength of competition between schools within a
particular market. This may yield important insight into what factors make a strong environment for ~chool
competition. 7
More technically, the presence of a spatial relationship among dependent variables can cause nonspatial
estimates to be biased and inconsistent. 8 Thus, the discovery of such a relationship casts doubt on the other
estimators and in particular may result in finding artificially significant effects fornonspatial estimators.
The presence of spatial correl1l,tion between theetror terms may also be a concern; if shocks froin one unit
of observation spill over to others, or if unobservable characteristics are correlated across spatial units .larger
than the unitof observation, failing to account for these correlations may result in inconsistently-estimated
standard errors. 9
The literature exa.n:llning strategic competition through spatial econometric methods is young but riowing
quickly. Blair and Staley (1995) examine a subset of Ohio school districts and find that a school incre~es its
test scores by half a point for each one point increase in the test scores of neighboring districts, hypothesizing
that schools compete on quality. Wagner and Porter (2000) and Greenbaum (2002) examine Ohio and
Pennsylvania resp.ective1y and find that teacher salaries in a district are positively influenced by .t~acher
salaries in nearby districts, so that an increase of one dollar in neighboring district teacher salaries increases
one's own teacher salaries by fifty six to ninety six cents. Ghosh (2010) studies Massachusetts public schools
under open enrollment and finds evidence of spiliovers in per student expenditures, although his point
estimates are significantly less than one.
A few recent studies take more care to establish causality through instrumented General Method. of
Moments (GMM) estimation and find larger spillovers seemingly indicative of stronger competition. I will
show in Section 5 that this may be thanks to their use of exogenous instruments for competition versus naIve
Maximum Likelihood estimates. Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum (2005) and Millimet and Rangaprasad
(2007) find evidence of teacher salary spillovers in Pennsylvania and spillovers in multiple school inputs 10 in
illinois; Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum find that a one dollar increase in teach~r salaries in districts on
See, e.g. Zan~ig (1997) and Hoxby (2000)
Tiebout (1956)
7 For example, Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007) find that Illinois schools only compete under periods of binding revenue
constraint or 'tax caps' by evaluating constrained versus unconstrained counties.
8 Anselin (1988)
.
9 See, e.g. Kelenkoski and Lacombe (2008)., who show that controlling for spatial correlation significantly' changes their
results.
lQ'Inputs' include teacher salary, the student-teacher ratio, total per-student expenditure, per-student capital expenditure,
and school size.
5
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3 Data and Methodology

a union's comparison list increases teacher salaries by about eighty four to ninety one cents - a larger effect
than in Greenbaum's earlier study of the same state - while Millimet and Rangaprasad define 'neighbors' as
districts in the same county and find spillovers in salary of about fifty six cents to a dollar per neighboring
dollar. Winters (2010) applies a general spatial model (SAC) to a national sample of public schools and finds
spillover effects on the order of sixty four cents per neighboring dollar of teacher salary using a distance-based
weighting scheme.
Nonetheless, there is appreciable need for further research. My work most closely follows from Millimet
and Rangaprasad (2007), who perform the most careful estimation and instrumentation out of any study
examining multiple inputs. They assert that strategic competition between sChool districts only occurs
during periods of revenue constraint caused by tax caps; Ohio's 'property tax reduction factor' thus makes
it a strong case for such conipetition. However, they restrict the effects of strategic competition to districts
within the same county. This imposes a somewhat arbitrary structure on the·data, sharply delineating the
bounds of an educational market where reality may well be more complex. Their failure to provide robustness
testing for the structure of the spatial weights matrix is not unusual in spatial econometric research, but it
nonetheless introduces the possibility that their results are idiosy~cratic to their particular choice of spatial
weights. 11
This paper contributes to the existing body of literature by providing the first treatment of spatial
dependence in school outputs (Le. test scores) where competition is treated as endogenous. It also joins the
small number of state-level studies employing spatial panel data, allowing for more accurate estimates in the
presence of unobservable, time- or district-invariant heterogeneity. In addition, J.employ careful robustness
testing for the form of the weighting matrix and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation of the spatially lagged
dependent variable (transforming the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model into a reduced-form Spatial Lag
of X (SLX) model) to provide greater confidence that the results are real. 12

3

Data and Methodology

Following'the existing literature and the brief theory outlined in the introduction, I assume that my
dependent variables are correlated across space after controlling for other determiriants. 13 After verifying
this assumption with statistical tests, I turn to regression analysis to determine whether the relationship
is causal - that is, whether there are spillovers between neighboring school districts in teacher salaries and
student achievement. The structural model estimated in this paper can thus be represented by aSpatial
Autoregressive (SAR) model:

(1)

Yit = C+ pWYit

+ XitfJ + Cit

where C is the constant term, and W is a nt x nt weights matrix that specifies the structure of the spatial
correlation for the dependent variable. Because the spatial weights are assumed invariant across years, W is
a concatenation of t identical n x n matrices along its diagonal; observations in each year interact with one
another, but observations in different years are given relative weights of zero. Because W is an nt x nt matrix
and Yis a nt x 1 vector, WY is a nt x 1 vector and WYit is a scalar representing a spatially-weighted sum of
See Pliimper and Neumayer (2010) for a look at problems relating to misspecification of the weighting matrices.
See Gibbons and Overman (2010) fora very good overview of endogeneity and identification issues in spatial econometric
research:
.
13 I test for this formally with robust LM tests derived by Elhorst (2009). I find very strong evidence of spatial autocorrelation
in both dependent variab.Ies.
11

12
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neighboring Y values to district i in year t. The coefficient p measures the extent of spatial autocorrelation
in the dependent variable, and c is ' a mean zero error term that is independent and identically .distributed
across observations.
Because of the presence of Y on the right-hand side of the SAR model, attempts at direct estimatIon
suffer from obvious end6geneity problems. 14 To overcome these problems, I instrument for Y by estimating
a Spatial (lag of) X (SLX) reduced-form of (1):

(2)

lit = C + W Zit'Y + X it f3 + cit

Where'Y is a vector of coefficients, Z is a nt x k matrix of exogenous instruments and WZ'Y is used to
instrument for pWY. In addition to increasing the strength (>f the argument for a causal effect from pWY,
Instrumental Variables estimation is consistent in the presence of spatially-correlated error terms. 15
I conduct several diagnostic tests for the validity of the IV estimates. First, I report the Kleibergen.:Paap
(2006) rk LM statistic, an underidentification test for the relevance of the mstruments . . Second, I report
the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)rk Wald Fstatistic for the strength of the instruments, using theeonventional
rule-of-thumb value of 10. Finally, I report Hansen's J statistic, an overidentification test forthe validity of
the instruments.
I produce the spatial weights matrix as follows: each element 'Wij of W is the inverse of the distance
between the centers of school districts i and j, with a 50-mile cutoff so that districts further than 50 miles
from district i are given zero weight. The matrix is then normalized so tp.at its rows sum to one in order
to act as a .set of weights and let any multiplicative effect emerge in p. Diagonal elements are set equal to
zero so that no district is its oVm neighbor. Thus, each element of the vector WY is a distance-weighted
average of Y across all other districts~thin .50 miles. The theoretical justification for the choice of inverse
distance weights is the assumption that parents find it less costly to observe, move to or 'send their children
to nearby dlstrictsthan those that are'far. The justification for the 50 mile radius is 'that school districts
on one side of a large metropolitan area should still consider as neighbors school districts on the other side;
when parents domove long distances within a metropolitan area, they are likely to move from suburbs into
other suburbs rather than into the nearer city center. While I believe these are defensible assumptions, I
provide robustness testing for the structure of the spatial weights matrix in Section 5.
I estimate two empirical models in this paper, each a problem unto itself. The first seeks to uncover
spillovers in, teacher salaries. Because the data does not include a measure of average teaCher .salary, I
define it as a district's total expenditures on teacher salaries divided by the number of full-time equivalent
(FTE) teachers. The explanatory variables fall into two categories: labor demand factors and labor supply
factors. Among the factors influencing school districts' demand for labor are district size 16 (measured
here by the number of schools in a district, the total enrollment, and the total number of teachers), the
county unenwloyment rate,17 and the value of the property tax base. 18 Among the factors influencing labor
supply are II.1ostly compensating differentials - Martin (forthcoming) suggests that teachers require higher
salaries to teach students from disadvantaged backgrounds, so I control for the share of minority students
and the share of low-income students as measured by eligibility for free and reduced-price lunch. Because
Vedder and Hall (2000) report that teachers prefer a low student-teacher ratio, I include the student-teacher
Again, see Gibbons and Overman (2010) for a full discussion,
Kelejian and Prucha (1998)
Ie Walden and Newmark (1995)
17 Taylor (forthcoming)
.
18 e.g. Lentz (1998) . and Winters (2009)
14
15
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ratio. Because teachers are also likely to require compensating differentials for most any type· of work
above basic, elementary-level classroom teaching, I also include the proportion of secondary teachers, 19
the proportions of kindergarten and prekindergarten teachers, the proportion of ungraded teachers, the
proportion of students in individualizecl education programs (IEP) , and the proportion of students who
are 'limited English proficientjEnglish language learners'(LEP JELL). Ohio is somewhat unique in allowing
school districts to collect residence-based income taxes in addition to property taxes; I thus include a dummy
variable for whether a district uses an income tax to control for any systematic differences that may cause
or arise from the adoption of such a tax. Unfortunately, the data lacks measlires of union activity. Because
teacher unions exert significant upward pressure on teacher wages,20 I expect to find bias in explanatory
variables correlated with union activity. However, because changes in the union status of Ohio school districts
are particularly rare, I expect a good deal of the effects of unionization to be absorbed by school district
fixed effects.
The second model tests for spilloveteffects in achievement test scores, examining proficiency rates on
the five sections of the 10th-grade Ohio Gra<iuation Test (OGT). Explanatory variables related to this
educational output largely involve uncontrollable student inputs and controllable institutional inputs. On
the institutional side, there is 'some evidence 21 that school districts benefit from increasing returns to scale
in education production - so I include the number of schools in a district as well as the total enrollment.
It is also pertinent to consider average teacher salary as a proxy for teacher qUality.22 Although there is
fIlixed empirical evidence on the. effectiveness of a small student-teacher ratio in increasing test scores 23
there is enough popular disCussion of this question that it is worth allowing for a possible effect. On the
student side, students' race and socio-economic"status - the latter whiCh I proxy for here by median income
and free lU:nch status - have been shown to influence test scores. 24 In addition, it is likely that students'
ability to learn in a traditional, English-speaking classroom will influence test scores, .so it is reasonable
to control for the proportion of students in ~P's and students who are LEP JELL. Following some more
recent work demonstratirig :that female students perform better on average than males,25 I control for the
proportion of female students. Some plausibly relevant variables are omitted from the study for lack of data.
It might be important to know, for example, the experience and education of teachers and administrators.
Fortunately, there is some debate as to whether these variables are actually significant in predicting student
achievement. 26
I employ different
techniques to control for the non-stationarity of each time series.
Much of the variation
.
.
in teacher salaries appears t.o stem Krom random fluctuation - while teachers rarely experience nominal pay
cuts, real wages can fall from year to year if nominal wages remain fixed or increase slowly. Therefore, it
is appropriate to use fixed effects to account for the time-invariant difrerencesbetween districts as well as
any year-to-year differences that may arise from changes in education finance at the state level. On the
other hand, the state proficiency tests arefrequ~ntlyrewritten in such a fashion that yearly fixed effects are
insufficient to explain some of the jumps in student performance. Because these changes are likely to capture
more of the state's attitude .towards testing than any school district's quality, I use a first differences model
for test scores. This allows me to attempt to tease out a measure of quality by examining which districts
19

20

21
22

23
24
25
26

Walden and Sogutlu (2001) .
See, e.g~ Hoxby (1996)
e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004), Bradley and Taylor (1998)
Figlio (1997)
See Hanushek (2003) for a discussion of the effectiveness of many educational inputs.
See Geller et al. (2006)
Such as U.S. Department of Education (2004)
See, e.g. Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005)
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performed better or worse relative to the overall change in 'performance' when the Ohio Department of
Education changes the tests.
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Data. Sources
Variable
Left-Hand Side
% Proficient on Ohio Gradllation Test - Average
% Proficient on OGT - Reading
% ~roficient on OGT - Writing
% Proficient on OGT - Mathematics
% Proficient on OGT - Science
% Proficient on OGT - Social Studies
Average Teacher Salary
Right-Hand Side
Number of Schools
Total Enrollment
FTE Teachers
Median Income
Students per Teacher
Teachers per Student
Average Property Value per Teacher
County Unemployment Rate
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers
Proportion Secondary Teachers
Proportion Ungraded Teachers
% Non-White
% Asian and Pacific Islander
% Black
% Hispanic
% Female
% Limited English Proficient
% Individualized Education Program
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch ·
Does the District Use an Income Tax?

Mean

Std. Dey

Min

Max

Source

89.50%
94.28%
93.61%
86.07%
85.12%
88.40%
$44,677

7.22%
5.32%
6.28%
8.73%
10.63%
8.86%
$6,426

44.68%
59.20%
49.10%
12.00%
25.80%
36.00%
$16,800

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
$76,099

ODE
ODE
ODE
ODE
ODE
ODE
CCD

6.05
2,941
182:7
$28,032
16.86
0.061
$1,688;105

9.44
4,892
338.2
$6,362
2.11
0.008
$808,250
1.34%
0.95%
1.69%
8.19%
2.48%
14.85%
1.27%
13.96%
3.04%
2.07%
2.20%
3.34%
15.57%
.4311

1
22
18
$15,775
3.67
0.043
$294,660
1.8%
0%
0%
4.15%

153
76,559
6670.7

CCD
CCD
CCD
ODE
CCD
CCD
ODT
BLS
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD
CCD

5.46%
0.53%
4.25%
34.22%
0.85%
7.69%
0.7&.%
5.44%
1.41%
47.75%
0.44%
13%
24.ui%
.2466

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
14.62%
0%
1.68%
0%
0

$65,666
26.44
0.270
$8,667,604
14.4%
14.08%
18.44%
95.59%
67.01%
100%
14.87%
99.91%
38.93%
59%
59.02% .
29.56%
86.2%
1

Note: All monetary values in 1998 dollars .

. I use the same exogenous instruments for both models. These are the percentage' of female students
enrolled in a school district, the median income for a school district, and the unemployment rate for the
county. The latter two are defensibly exogenous to average teacher salaries and test. scores because they
are determined by broader economic forces; although higher student achievement has been linked by many
researchers to better labor market outcomes, such effects are neither likely to be significant on the time scale
of the sample nor be confined toa particular school district. They are defensibly relevant to average teacher
salaries and test scores because they partially determine both the labor market conditions facing prospective
teachers and the expected return to education for students. The percentage of female students is defensibly
exogenous to average teacher salaries and test scores because the proportion of female students enrolled in a
particular school in a given year is essentially random; though the influence of all-female or all-male private
schools may be of concern, it is unlikely to be large enough to offset the number of families ·with children in

4 Empirical Findings

public schools. The percentage of female students is defensibly relevant to both· instruments because female
students are easier to teach and because they perform better than male students on standardized tests.
Following Kelejianand Prucha (1998), I instrument for WY with the first and second-order spatial lags of
these three variables.
The data ~ which describe the population of Ohio public school districts - are drawn from four sources.
The first is the U.S. Department of Education Common Core of Data (CCD), which is a~ailable from the
National Center for Education Statistics. The CCD provides annual data for all Local Education Agencies in
the United States, including traditional local school districts as well as regional education services agencies
and public charter school agencies. In particular, the CCD provides some important data on stud€nts
and staffing - including enrollment by gender, ethnicity, and proxies for socioeconomic status as well as
.
.
staff breakdowns by occupation .- and richly-detailed breakdowns of annual revenue and exIJenditures. The
second data source is the Ohio Department of Education (ODE)'s interactive Local Report Card, which
provides district-level, annual data on such diverse measures as median incomes, proficiency . test scores,
on-time graduation rates and disciplinary illcidents. The third is t~e Ohio Department of Taxation (ODT)'s
Tax Data Series, which provides annual school district level data·on property values, taxes levied and tax
rates. The fourth source of datais the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which provides county-level data
on u~employment .rates and the Midwest Consumer Price Index I use to control for inflation.
I restrict the sample along two lines. First, I remove the two school districts that came into existence

during the sample period of ·1998-2007. Second, I remove five other districts - the four Lake Erie island
schools and the College Corner school district (which is jointly administered by the Indiana Department
of Education) ~. for missing data, enrollments of zero, and similar irregularities. After paring away these
districts, I am left with a balanced panel of 607 school districts across 10 years, for a total of 6070 observations.
I provide summary statistics in Table 1.

4

Empirical Findings

The main results for teacher salaries and test scores, respectively, are presented in Tables 2 and 3. I first
note ·that each. specification fares extremely well in terms of the identification tests; the Kleibergen-Paap
statistics provide evidence that the instruments are relevant and :strong, while the Hansen J. test fails to
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity at any reasonable significance level.
I turn my attention first to teacher salaries. Because the dependent variable is presented in logged form,

the coefficients on the logged independent variables can be ·interpreted as elasticities. For example, the
estimated marginal effect of a 1% increase in the number of schools in a district is a 0.028% increase in
average teacher salaries in that district. · For the independent variables that are proportions or percentages,
the coefficients report the effect of an increase of 100 percentage points (from 0 to 1). Therefore, a one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in a district . is expected to decrease average teacher
salaries by 0.448%.
The results tend to agree with expectations and with previo~s studies, but there are a few notable
differences. Firstly, there is a strong relationship between student enrollment, teacher employment and
teacher salaries. These coefficients should be interpreted with a degree of caution; it is unlikely that enrolling
one percent more students increases teacher salaries by 0.4%, or that employing one percent more teachers
decreases teacher salaries by 0.5%, ·but rather that these variables tend to increase or decrease together
to smaller net effect. I also find that teachers who teach minority students are paid less, not more. This
relationship is likely non-linear and likely due to the extremely skewed distribution of minority students in

9

Table 2: Strategic interaction over average teacher salaries
W*Ln(Average Teacher Salaries)
Ln(Number of Schools)
tn(Total Enrollment)
Ln(Full Time Equivalent Teachers)
% Non-White
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch
% Individualized Education Program
% Limited English Proficient
Ln (Students per Te.acher)
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers
Proportion Secondary Teachers
Proportion Ungraded Teachers
Ln(Median Income)
County Unemployment Rate
Ln(Average Property Value per Teacher)
School District Income Tax Dummy

Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (underidentification test)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test)
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test)

0.985**
(0.202)
0.028
(0.007)
0.399***
(0.022)
-0.499***
(0.027)
-0.118***
(0.042)
0.021
(0.019)
0.080*
(0.048)
0.109***
(0:031)
0.17i***
(0.015)
-0.324***
(0.105)
0.158***
(0 .059)
0.040***
(0.015)
0.031
(0:040)
0,046(0:221)
-0.448***
(0.109)
0.037***
(0;009)
-0.005
(0.004)

[p = 0.000]
28.30

[p = 0.812]

Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the average salary for all teachers in a school district.
Estimation is by GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and
second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income,
and the percentage of female students in the district. Additional controls include school district and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbi.trary heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

Ohio; when the dependent variable is taken as a level instead of a log, the coefficient changes sign. However,
there is some reason to be more confident in the insignificance of free lunch status in determining teaCher
salary. Because Southeast Ohio is both the poorest area in the state and the area with the fewest minority
students - and because .Ohio's rural areas in general have fewer minority students and lower incomes than the

10
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Table 3: Strategic interaction over stat e st andardized test scores
W*Standardized Test Scores
Ln(Nu~ber of Schools)

Ln(Total Enrollment)
Ln(Average Teacher Salary)
Ln(Median Income)
Ln(Teachers per Student)

% Asian and Pacific Islander

% Black
% Hispanic
% Individualized Education Program

% Limited English Proficient
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch

% Female

1.0.58***
(0..0.93)
0..0.0.1
(0..0.0.8)
-0..0.15
(0..0.23)
-0..0.0.4
(0..0.17)
0..0.99
(0. .155)
-0..0.0.1
(0..0.18)
0..0.66
(0..270.)
-0..20.7**
(0..10.4)
-0..125
(0..185)
-0..0.17
(0. .0.50.)
-0..0.22
(D.D3!)
-0..0.0.2
(0..0.28)
-0..0.25
(0..0.29)

Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (underidentification test)
[p = D.OOOJ
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test)
39.94
[p"; 0.733J
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test)
Notes: The dependent variable is the one-year (Le. first) difference of the average percentage of students scoring
'proficient' or higher across all five' sections of the Ohio Graduation Test (Reading, Writing, Mathematics, Science,
Social Studies). Estimation is via GMM,and all independent variables are also first differences. The .instrument set
for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first differences of the first- and second-order spatial lags of
the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female
students in the district. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at 10.%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

suburbs

~

Ohio is a good case for examining poverty independent of race. It may be that teachers truly do

not require compensating differentials to teach poor students, but that previous studies conflate the effects
of student race and poverty. Finally, I find no impact on teacher salaries from the use of a school district
income tax. These taxes are sometimes financially motivated but sometimes politically motivated (because
they are less regressive than property taxes), and may not be a good overall indicator. or determinant of a
district's revenue.
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable bears a little more interpretation. Though it also
represents an elasticity - and an elasticity very close to one - the variable itself is a distance-weighted sum
of the logged average teacher salaries in all school districts within a 50 mile radius. Therefore, a 1% increase
in teacher salaries in all other school districts within .'?O miles would be expected to increase teacher salaries
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by 0.985% in the district in question. An increase of more than 1% in districts that are near and less than
1% in districts that are far will also be expected to increase teacher salaries in the district of interest by
about 0.985%. However, we should expect a 1% increase in the average teacher salary in a single particular
district to raise teacher salaries in nearby districts by some fraction of 0.985%, because school districts under
this weighting scheme have many neighbors. Therefore, we should only expect to see large changes in salary
when many school districts are affected by exogenous shocks to the labor market.
Next, I turn to the evidence from proficiency tests. Note that 4ere the dependent variable is presented
in level form; therefore, the interpretations of the estimated coefficients should be as percentage points and
not percentages. For example, a 1% annual increase in the median income in a district might be expected to
increase the proportion of students earning' 'proficient' or higher on the Ohio Graduation Test by just one
thousandth of a percentage point· over the previous year (although of course the effect is not significant).
The interpretation for an independent variable in level form is as' above - its coefficient represents the effect
of an increase from 0% to 100%. Therefore, an increase of one percentage point in the proportion of black
students is expected to result in a decrease in the proportion of students earning 'proficient' or higher on the
OGT by 0.2 percentage points versus the previous year.
Overall, I find that little besides the strategic effect is significant; it is likely that the levels of the
independent variables matter more for overall student achievement than the year-to-year differences matter
foryear~to-year changes in achievement. The caveat for interpreting the spatial autoregressive term is the
same: .though school district is expected to increase its scores by around 1.058 percentage points for each
one percentage point increase in the test scores .of all neighbOIjng districts, the spillover from anyone school
.district to its neighbors will be smaller. The overall implications of
estimate of 1.058 are that school
districts will respond in small ways to changes in each neighboring district so that they maintain parity with
their neighbors overall- or, at least, that they do not fall further behind.

a

an

Although these results are strong and the tests confirm the validity ofthe instruments, some concern may
linger about the directionality of these simultaneously-determined inputs and outputs. Therefore I turn to
the lagged specific~tions in Table 4. The lagged models allow me to establish a clearer direction of causation
- because a district's behavior this year cannot change what its neighbors did last year- and to establish
some sort of 'window' v.rithinwhich strategic competition occurs.
Table 4; Strategic interaction across time .
.Dependent Variable
Time Lag (Years)
W'Dependent Variable

Number of Observations

Average OGT Performance

Ln (Average Teacher Salary)
1
0.985'"
(0.202)

1.309"
(0.335)

2
0.790"
(0.375)

6070

5463

4856

3
0.373
(0.268)

4
·0.267
(0.395)

4249

3642

1.086'"
(0.159)

1
1.184'"
(0.201)

2
1.337'"
(0.237)

3
1.052'"
(0.281)

(0 .~S8)

6070

5463

4856

4249

3642

4
-0.648

[0.000]
[O.OOO}
Underidentification Test
[O.OOO}
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.0001
42.71
33 .03
26.28
26.67
58.03
Weak Identification Test
28.30
11.60
13.23
41.90
'25.33
[0,633]
[0.001]
[0.000]
[0.011]
[0.000]
Overidentification Test
[0.812]
[0.000]
[O.OOO}
[0.4291
[0.0191
Note: Estimation is via GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent va.riable comprises. the first- and second-order spatial lags of the
county unemploymen~ rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of 'female students in the distrkt. Additi'onal controls
include school district and year fixed effects. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses rue
robust to arbitrary hE;teroskedasticity.
* SigniScant ~t 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

The results are striking; in both models, the point estimates for the one year lag on strategic competition
are greater than their contemporaneous counterparts (although neither.is significantly different from one).
The point estimates for the elasticity of strategic competition range between 0.79 and 1.337, and appear to
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5 Sensitivity Analysis

follow an inverted 'U' shape. This evidence weakly suggests that districts may be better able to respond to
neighbors' behavior as they have observed it in the past than what they expect it to be in the present. Iri
both cases, .lags are not significant beyond three years, suggesting that districts respond more immediately.
However, these results come with two important caveats. First, I use a fixed effects model instead of a first
differences model for the standardized test scores. While I am unsure that fixed effects can appropriately
model the frequent changes to the Ohio Graduation Test,usingfirst differences makes it impossible to
gain any meaningful infomllition from .a lagged regression. 27 Second, the regression diagnostics raise some
concern about the validity of the results; specifically, most of the lagged results reject the null hypothesis
of instrument validity in the Hansen J test. In addition, the J statistic grows with the time lag. I selected
the instrumental variables - the unemployment rate, median income, and percentage of female students for their plausible, intuitiveexogeneity. There is no similarly intuitive reaSon to stIspect reverse causation
between teacher salaries today and; for instance, the unemployment rate two years ago. Regardless, the
lagged results should be viewed with some amount of caution for these two reasons.

5 . Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is important (though often neglected) for spatial econometrics, because the structure
of the spatial weights is decided arbitrarily by the researcher and not estimated from the data. It is the~efore
possible to obtain results that are idiosyncratic to a particular choice of weights matrix and that disappear
when alternative weights are used. To attempt to banish such concerns, I estimate the full, contemporaneoustime model using a variety of spatial weights matrices. Although I tested agreat many different specifications,
I present a representative few in Table 5.
Table 5: · Robustness of spatial weights .matrix
Dependent Variable
Ln(Average Teacher Salary)
Inverse
Inverse
Weights Type
Binary
4 Nearest
Distance
Distance
Squared
Neigh. ·bors
Distance
Cutoff Distance
25 nU.
75 mi.
50 nU.
N/A
W*Dependent Variable
0.748*
1.145***
1.396
1.386**
(0.442)
(0.134)
(0.850)
(0.651)

Binary .
D.istance
50 mi.
1.049**(0.092)

Average OGT Performance
. Inverse
Inverse
4 Nearest
Distance
Squared
NeighDistance
bors
25 nU.
75 nU.
N/A
1.047***
1.052***
·1.059***
(0.108)
(0.100)
(0.132)

Underidentification Test
[0.000]
[0.235]
[0.008]
[0.302]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
64.55
23.28
29.44
Weak Identification Test
1.35
3.05
1.19
12~76
169.36
Overidentification Test
[0.986]
[0.054]
[0.968]
(0.211]
[0.278]
[0.193]
[0.642]
[0.859]
Note: Estimation is via GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and second-order
spatial lags of the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female
students in the district . . For the test. score results, these instruments (like the dependent variable) are first differences. Percentage
female instruments were dropped fot the binary distance regressions, as the full instrument set was overidentified. Additional
controls are as in Tables 2 and 3. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

The first robustness test involves changing the weighting scheme - though I maintain the cutoff at fifty
miles, I change the distance weighting to a 'binary' scheme to that all districts within fifty miles receive equal
weight. The second alternative specification weights by inverse distance like the primary models, but uses
a twenty-five mile cutoff to reduce the distance at which districts call be considered neighbors at all. The
27 The difference between test scores last year and two years ago should be independent of the difference between this year
and last year. Indeed, lagged difference regressions were all insignificant.
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third weights structure changes both the weights and the cutoff distance, allowing districts to be considered
neighbors out to a radius of severity-five miles but weighting them by the square of the inverse distance
to increase the relative weight given to nearby districts. The final weights matrix does something entirely
different, choosing the four nearest districts and giving them each a weight of one quarter.
The results support the validity of the primary regressions,. though the evidence is a great deal more
robust for test scores than . for teacher salaries. While the diagnostics generally support the exogeneity
of the instruments, the teacher salary regressions suffer from weak instrument and/or instrument relevance
problems for three of the four matrices. This is likely a function of the data available, rather than the validity
of the theory; the most significant instrumental variableaffecting teacher salaries is the unemployment rate,
where data is only available at the county level. Because the twenty five mile cutoff, the squared inverse
distance weights, and the four nearest neighbors weights all place great weight on observations which are
likely to be in the same county; they suffer from a lack of variation in the values of that exogenous instrument.
In particular, the fifty mile binary wei~;ht ~atrix - which puts greater relative weight on distant districts
than the inverse distance matrix -benefits from more variation in the unemployment rate llJld thus appears
to identify the strategic effect more .strongly than the primary specification.
In addition to the sensitivity analysis for the weights structure, I perform one final set of regressions comparing the primary results to those obtained from non-spatial Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); from Maximum Likelihood (ML), and from a poorly-instrumented GMM that uses all of W X and W 2 X as instruments.
As mentioned in Section I, the presence of spatial dependence can cause non-spatial estimates to be biased
and inconsistent. Though ML estimation is often used in the spatial econometrics literature, the endogeneity
of WY creates a far larger problem .for the estimates than the "spurious precision" (Gibbons and Overman
2010) ofML is worth. And thoughKelejian and Prucha (1998) have co~firmed that {X, WX, W 2X, ... }
are valid instruments for estimating spatial autoregressive models by Two Stage Least Squares or GMM,
a number of applied researchers performing spatial econometrics simply include all of the.se ~instruments'
without considering that several variables in X are likely to be endogenous. Therefore it is worthwhile to
examine the possible biases caused by these errors in estimation. These results are presented · in Tables 6
and 7.
The non-spatial estimates in Table 6 appear to suffer from some slight biases and errors; the we11instrumented regression finds stronger evidence than the others that teachers who teach minority students
are paid less, and weaker evidence that teachers who teach IEP students are paid more. Overall, the problems
that incorrectly estimating the spatial autoregressive term inflicts on the non-spatial estim<.ttes are minor even for the OLS regression that simply ignores spatial dependence. On the other hand, the estimates for
the spatial autocorrelation coefficient p suffer from severe biases when improperly estimated: Not only do
ML eStimation and poor GMM instrumentation significantly underestimate the effects of strategic competition, they also provide the aforementioned "spurious precisi~n"; the standard errors for poorly-instrumented
GMM and ML are roughly one-quarter and one-tenth the size ofthose for the properly instrumented regreS"'
sian. Rather than providing roughly correct coefficient estimates, these methods produce estimates that are
precisely wrong.
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Table 6: Strategic interaction over average teacher salaries - model comparison
Model
Nonspatial
Maximum
OLS
Likelihood
0.314***
W*Ln(Average Teacher Salaries)
(0.017)
0.028***
0.028***
Ln(Number of Schools)
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.417***
Ln(Total Enrollment)
0.425***
(0.013) .
(0.013)
-0.501 ***
Ln(FUlI Time Equivalent Teachers)
-0.502***
(0.017)
(0.016)
-0.080**
-0.062*
% Non-White
(0.033)
(0.035)
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch
0.012
0.015
(0.016)
(0.015)
%Individualized Education PrOgram
0.107**
0.098**
(0.043)
(0.040)
o.lig***
.0.115***
% Limited English Proficient
(0.038)
(0.036)
0.180***
Ln(Sfudents per Teacher)
0.181***
(0.014)
.(0.013)
-0.315***
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers.
-0.307***
(0.095)
(0.101)
0.122**
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers
0.103**
(0.052)
(0.049)
Proportion Secondary Teachers
0.039***
0.040***
(0.014)
(0.013)
0.Ql6
P~oportion Ungraded Teachers
0.022
(0 .031)
(0.030)
0;040
Ln(Median Income)
0.047
(0.182)
(0.193)
~0.489***
County Unemployment ·Rate
-0.510***
(O ~ l11)
(0 .105)
0.048***
0.044***
Ln(Average Property Value per Teacher)
(0.008)
(0.008)
School District Incom~ Tax Dummy
-0.006
-0.005
(0.003)
(0.004)
Robust to Arbitrary Heteroskedasticity

NO

NO

GMM- 'Bad'
Instrument Set
0.433***
(0.053)
0.028***
(0.607)
0.392***
(0.020)
-0.479***
(0.024)
-0.055
(0.038)
-0.010
(0.018)
0.126***
(0.046)
0.105***
(0.031).
0.175***
(0.015)
-0.340***
(0·. 102)
0.108*
(0.057)
0.037**
(0015)
0.Oi2
(0 ,037) .
0.010 :
(0.209) ·

GMM - 'Good'
Instrument Set
0.985***
(0.202)
0.028***
(0.007)
0.399***
(0.022)
-0.499***
(0.027)
-0.118***
(0.042)
0.021
(0.019)
0.080*
(0.048)
0.109***
(0.031)
0.177***
(0.015)
-0.324***
(Oj05)
0.158***
(0.05~)

(0.105)
0.038***
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.003)

0.040***
(0.015)
·0.031
(0.040)
0.046
(0.221)
-0.448***
(0.109)
0.037***
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.004)

YES

YES

-0.464**~

Underidentification Test
[p= O.OOQ]
[p = 0.000]
485.02
Weak Identification Test
28.30
Overidentification Test
[p = 6,000]
[p = 0.812]
Notes: ·The dependent va.riable is ·the natural log of-the average salary for all teachers in a school district. The 'good' instrument
set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment
rate, the natural log of the schooldistrict 's median income, and the percentage of female students in the district. The 'bad'
instrument set for the .spatially lagged dependeJ).t variable comprises the first- and second-order spatial lags· of all right hand side
variables in the model. Additional controls are school district and year fixed effects. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2
and 3, with p-values in brackets.
.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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Table 7: Strategic interaction over state standardized test scores - model comparison
Maximum
Model
Nonspatial
Likelihood
OLS
W*Standardized Test Scores
0.920***
(0.017)
Ln(Number of Schools)
0.002
0.003
(0.006)
(0.008)
Ln(Totai Enrollment)
0.083***
-0.004
(0.019)
(0.026)
Ln(Average Teacher Salary)
0.107***
0.006
(0 .013)
(0.018)
Ln(Median Income)
-1.413***
0.0004
(0.025)
(0.117)
Ln(Teachers per Student)
0.122***
0.013
(0.013)
(0-018)
-0.010
% Asian and Pacific Islander
-0.441
(0.404)
(0.302)
-0.210**
% Black
-0.180
(0.089)
(0.U8)
% Hispanic
-0.217-0.145
'(0.151)
(0.201)
% Individualized Education Program
-0.020
0.066
(0.044)
(0.060)
% Limited English Proficient
-0.025
0.005
(0.074)
(0.055)
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch
-0,048**
-0.010
(0.020)
(0.015)
-0.012"
% Female
-0.021
(0.033)
(0.044)

Robust to Arbitrary Heteroskedasticity
Underidentification Test "
Weak Identification Test
Overidentification Test

NO

NO

GMM- 'Bad'
InstrUIpent Set
1.014***
(0.031)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.021)
0.0003
(0.015)
0.047
(0.090)
0.006
(0.015)
0.046
(0.266)
-0.220**
(0.105)
-0.072
(0.185)
-0.008
(0.049)
-0.018
(0.036)
-0.003
(0 .018)
-0.035
(0.029)

GMM - 'Good'
Instrument Set
1.059***
(0.093)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.015
(0.023)
-0.004
(0.017)
0.099
(0.155)
-O~OOl

(0.018)
0.066
(0.270)
-0.207**
(0.104)
-0.125
(0.185)
-0.017
(0.050)
-0.022
(0.031)
-0.003
(0.018)
-0.025
(0.029)

YES

YES

[p = O:ooOJ

[p = o.oOOJ

159.92

39.94

[p = 0.581J

[p = 0.733J

Notes: The dependent variable is the one-year (i.e. first) difference of the average percentage of students scoring 'proficient' or
higher aCross all five sections of the Ohio Graduation Test (Reading, Writing, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies). Estimation
is via GMM, and all independent variables are also first differences. The 'good' instrument set for the spatially lagged
dependent variable comprises the first differences of the first- and second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment rate,
the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female students in the district. The 'bad'
instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises"the first- and second-order spatial lags of all right hand side
variables in the model. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets.
• Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

The case for test scores is different: the biases in the spatial autocorrelation coefficient are relatively
minor compared to those for teacher salaries. While the ML regression estimates the strategic effect to be
significantly less than one - again, partially due to artificial precision in the standard errors - the poorlyinstrumented GMM finds :results that are not significantly different from those of the well-instrumented
model and which still pass the statistical test for instrument validity.28 The most striking differences are
now between the spatial and non-spatial models. The non-spatial OL8 model makes serious errors of both
types - including the confusing conclusion that a 1% increase in a school district's median income will
28 The poorly-instrumented model is likely 'saved' here by the lack of information in the largely insignificant control variables
that comprise its i.nstrument set.
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decrease test scores by about 1.4 points. These results hig~light the importance of testing and controlling
for spatial autocorrelation even in non-spatially minded work.

6

Conclusion

Invoking a broad theoretical and empirical foundation of strategic competition between local schools,
I employ a spatial autoregressive model to examine the extent of such competition between public school
districts in Ohio. Building upon previous results which provide evidence that school districts behave strategically when setting input levels, I extend the field of competition to outputs and find a significant competitive
effect whose magnitude suggests schools act to maintain parity with their neighbors. I show that the significance and magnitude of this competitive effect is robust to various definitions of 'Iieighbor', and provid~
evidence that these strategic effects persist within a two to th:r:ee year window. I further provide suggestive
evidence that the'true magnitude of competition may be larger than found iIi some previous studies due to
the biases induced by treating such competition as exogenous.
The policy implications of these findings are reassuring; a defensibly causal. estimate of parity for the
spatial autocorrelation parameter suggests that school districts actively 'keep up' 'with their neighbors.
Therefore, fruitful innovations undertaken at just a few schools may spread to others' over time. This provides
some support for the ',bottom-up', experimental
paradigm
of school reform; it suggests that uniform standards
,
,
may not be necessary for uniform improvement. However, because the spatial autocorrelation parameter is
not significantly greater than one, the results suggest that schools will make no such improvements without
some form of impetus.
The results presented in this paper open up several avenues for further research. Empirical analysis
to confirm the robustness of the relationship - particularly in other states - is necessary. Because'charter
schools are often regarded as the champions of the experimental paradigm of school reform, it would be
worthwhile to investigate whether traditional public schools also respond to the decisions of nontraditional
pubIlc or private schools. This study also presents a 'black box' view of competition in educational outputs:
Are spillovers in test scores merely a function of spillovers in inputs such as teacher salaries and capital
expenditures? Of is there a Significant unobservable component, perhaps the adoption of successful curricula
or teaching metho.ds? A multidimensional model allowing for cross-policy effects like ,t hat used by Millimet
and Rangaprasad (2007) may be able to answer this question,· but it is beyond the scope of this pap'er.
That said, my ,findings contribute to the growing pool of evide~c~ suggesting that competition can alter
the behavior of public schools, and also provide reassurance that spillovers in school inputs found in previous
studies carry over to the case of outputs - that competition among public schools provides real benefits to
students.
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